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Abstract. This paper describes our work on demonstrating verifica-
tion technologies on a flight-critical system of realistic functionality, size,
and complexity. Our work targeted a commercial aircraft control sys-
tem named Transport Class Model (TCM), and involved several stages:
formalizing and disambiguating requirements in collaboration with do-
main experts; processing models for their use by formal verification tools;
applying compositional techniques at the architectural and component
level to scale verification. Performed in the context of a major NASA
milestone, this study of formal verification in practice is one of the most
challenging that our group has performed, and it took several person
months to complete it. This paper describes the methodology that we
followed and the lessons that we learned.
1 Introduction
This paper demonstrates the use of verification approaches on a safety-critical
system of realistic functionality, size, and complexity. The work addresses a ma-
jor milestone of the NASA Aviation Safety program and was performed over
several months by a team involving four verification experts, one senior software
engineer, and an aerospace engineer.
The target of our study is a Simulink model of a twin-engine aircraft simula-
tion named Transport Class Model (TCM). The TCM was selected for a number
of reasons. First, it is unclassified and can therefore be shared outside of NASA.
This is important to us because we would like the community to benefit from
our experience and to be able to use this as a common benchmark on which
additional verification technologies can be applied. Second, the system was de-
veloped independently by a different NASA center and therefore we had no prior
knowledge of its potential errors, or its design. The setting was therefore simi-
lar to one in which a safety-critical system is handed to verification experts for
analysis and certification, where the experts were not involved in the system
design.
As the TCM does not come with requirements, we used several sources such
as pilot training manuals and the Federal Aviation Regulations for commercial
? F. Howar did this work while at Carnegie Mellon University.
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aircraft, to collect relevant requirements for our study. A significant amount of
our work involved formalizing and disambiguating requirements in collaboration
with domain experts. The resulting requirements constitute verification proper-
ties, which we encoded as synchronous observers in Simulink.
The Simulink models that describe the system had to be processed in order
to be usable by the verification tools utilized in this study. We used SMT-based
model checking, and in particular the PKind [22] to verify the properties. The
Simulink models including the synchronous observers were automatically trans-
lated into the synchronous dataflow language Lustre [6], to be processed by
PKind.
A major goal of this work was to experiment with compositional techniques
to enable the scalable use of formal methods for systems of realistic size. Com-
positional verification constructs a verification argument for a complex system
by composing simpler verification results at the level of the system components.
There are several well-known advantages to taking such an approach. Scalability
of verification is a major driver. Through the decomposition of system-level re-
quirements into component-level ones at design time, it is easier to assign clear
responsibilities to the developer of each component. Finally, as components of a
system change or evolve, compositional verification enables the reuse of verifica-
tion results of unchanged components.
The work described in this paper is one of the most challenging verification
exercises that our team has performed. As such, it forced us to define a high-level
methodology for the verification of flight-critical systems, and has enabled us to
comment on advantages and limitations of verification techniques and tools in
handling such systems. We found that close collaboration between verification
and domain experts is required to formalize requirements and, in particular,
assumptions about the physical system, without which verification would fail.
Compositional verification is key in constructing scalable and meaningful proofs
for complex systems in the aeronautics domain.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
TCM, while section 3 discusses the process through which we obtained require-
ments and disambiguated and formalized them for verification. The verification
effort itself is presented in section 4. The experience and lessons learned from
this substantial effort are discussed in section 5, with section 6 placing this effort
in the context of related work and section 7 concluding the paper and discussing
future work.
2 The Transport Class Model
Our target system is derived from NASA Langley’s Transport Class Model
(TCM) [20], a simulator of a mid-size (approximately 250,000 lb.), twin-engine,
commercial transport-class aircraft. The TCM is not intended as a high-fidelity
simulation of any particular transport aircraft. Rather, it is meant to be repre-
sentative of the types of non-linear behaviors of this class of aircraft.
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Fig. 1. The Simulink guidance and controls system for the TCM.
The TCM includes models for the avionics (with transport delay), actuators,
engines, landing gear, nonlinear aerodynamics, sensors (including noise), aircraft
parameters, equations of motion, and gravity. It is primarily implemented in
Simulink, consisting of approximately 5700 Simulink blocks. The system also
includes several thousands of lines of C/C++ code in libraries, primarily used
for the engines and the nonlinear aerodynamics models. Our work studies the
guidance and controls models and their properties, within the overall context of
the TCM system, and these are implemented entirely in Simulink.
Fig. 1 depicts the top-level controls Simulink (data-flow) diagram. An air-
craft can be controlled either manually (using a control stick and pedals), or
through the mode control panel (MCP) of the flight computer (autopilot). In
the diagram, pink-shaded boxes with dark outlines (to the left) highlight the
inputs from the pilot and the MCP. Red arrows identify the various controls
subsystems (each subsystem may itself be a complex collection of subsystems),
explained below. The TCM contains inner loop proportional-integral (PI) con-
trollers for all three angular axes of motion (roll, pitch, and yaw). These inner
loop controllers function regardless of whether the pilot flies manually or the au-
topilot issues commands. Additionally, the TCM’s autopilot can control altitude
(either by flying to a directed altitude, or holding a current altitude), can reach
and maintain a desired flight path angle (FPA), can reach and maintain a desired
heading, and can control the airplane’s speed. Finally, the blue-shaded box with
the dark outline (to the left) in the diagram shows the collected outputs—the
commands to the actuators.
3 Requirements: Elicitation and Formalization
Written requirements are not available for the autopilot and controls software
of the TCM because it was not intended for embedded production-level code.
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The original implementers of the software informed us that their release process
was based on a side-by-side comparison of behaviors between the simulator and
an experimental aircraft. However, for the purpose of our study, we need safety
properties representative of those used in the certification of civil aviation trans-
port vehicles. For this reason, NASA’s Armstrong Flight Research Center chose
relevant requirements from the Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) governing
commercial aviation transport vehicles (Part 25) [10], such as the following:
FAR-25.672b: The design of the stability augmentation system or of any
other automatic or power operated system must permit initial coun-
teraction of failures of the type specified in section 25.671(c) without
requiring exceptional pilot skill or strength, by either the deactivation
of the system, or a failed portion thereof, or by overriding the failure by
movement of the flight controls in the normal sense.
FAR requirements such as the one above refer to several high-level systems,
but in our study we focus on the Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GNC)
system of Fig. 1. The GNC is divided into three types of components: (i) mode
logic capturing the modes in which the autopilot can operate, how these modes
are enabled and disabled, and which control systems are enabled by particular
modes, (ii) components targeting controllability of the airplane by ensuring that
the actuators can, at any instant, respond appropriately to a command, and (iii)
components ensuring the stability and maneuverability of the aircraft, making
the aircraft robust to state disturbances and easily controlled by the pilot.
The TCM does not contain detailed Simulink models for Navigation. More-
over, classical mathematical techniques like Lyapunov theory [23] provide well-
understood ways of checking stability and maneuverability properties. The for-
mal verification tools that our study targets are better suited for checking mode
logic and simple controllability properties of type (i) and (ii) above. As a conse-
quence, we focus on GNC-level requirements, and sub-requirements (also called
“child"-requirements) that refer exclusively to Guidance. A child-requirement of
the above FAR requirement, is, for example, the following:
GNC-150: The Guidance Navigation and Control Function shall enable
the pilot to transition the vehicle from one flight condition to another
(i.e. climb to level flight) under all operating conditions including failure
of a single engine.
In order to elicit such higher-level requirements into properties that can be
checked on the components of our case-study, we examined pilot training materi-
als for the Boeing 737 (B737) Automatic Flight Systems [27]. B737 is within the
class of vehicles that the TCM simulator targets. Within these training materi-
als were behavioral specifications for the B737 Altitude Acquire, Altitude Hold,
and Level Change Modes, equivalent in functionality to the TCM’s Altitude
Controller. We also used the specifications for the B737 Heading Select Mode as
the desired properties for the TCM Heading Controller, the B737 Glide Slope
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Capture mode for the TCM Flight Path Angle Controller, and the B737 Au-
tothrottle for the TCM’s Autothrottle. We started with 88 GNC requirements,
which we tried, with the help of these B737 documents, to map into safety prop-
erties of the Guidance system. This effort resulted into 20 properties, illustrated
in Table 1. These 20 properties are sub-requirements of GNC-level requirements,
such as the GNC-150 requirement shown above. In the rest of this paper, we will
use property G-120 as a running example:
G-120: The guidance shall be capable of climbing at a defined rate, to be
limited by minimum and maximum engine performance and airspeeds.
3.1 Formalization
For verification, the properties shown in Table 1 must be disambiguated and
formulated in terms of the signals (inputs and outputs) of the TCM model.
Moreover, they have to be written in a formal language which, in our case, is
Simulink (see Section 4). The requirements formalization process was performed
over several iterations, and involved discussions between domain and verification
experts. It included several steps, presented in this section.
1. Develop a shared understanding of the requirement. Natural language of-
ten allows for slightly different interpretations. In some cases, properties even
interfered or contradicted one another. For example, what does “... to be lim-
ited by minimum and maximum engine performance ...” mean in the context of
G-120? It could mean that a. the guidance shall be capable to climb when com-
manded to do so, but the climb rate should be limited by engine performance
and airspeeds, or that b. the guidance is only required to be able to climb when
the defined rate is within the minimum and maximum engine performance. For
all such cases, we consulted with the domain expert on the team to develop a
common understanding and/or we refined properties to be more precise (e.g.,
interpretation a. was selected for property G-120).
2. Decompose the property into a requirement on the control system and as-
sumptions about the physics of the airplane. Since we reason formally only about
controllability, we decomposed the properties into a part that can be proven for-
mally and into corresponding assumptions about stability and physics. Such
assumptions were not formally verified, but were confirmed by domain experts.
For example, while G-120 specifies that the aircraft shall climb at a defined rate,
the control system has got just sensors and actuators. Since we do not math-
ematically specify the physics behavior, we do not have a formal definition of
what it means to climb at a defined rate in terms of the sensor values—instead
we define climbing solely in terms of the actuator commands. Since we focus
on instantaneous controllability, we require that the control system outputs a
value to an actuator that moves the aircraft into the right direction (e.g., if the
current climb rate is smaller than the commanded climb rate, the control system
should issue a command to the ailerons that would pitch the aircraft upwards).
We then assume that the inner loop controllers and physics will result in an
increased climb rate.
6 Brat et. al.
Table 1. A summary of verified properties on the TCM.
# Property Assumptions Original Requirement
1 G-250 G-260 The heading control mode, when selected, sends roll
commands to turn to and maintain the commanded heading.
2 G-110 G-220,G-260 The guidance system shall be capable of steering to and
following a specified heading.
3 G-120 G-180,A1,A2, The guidance shall be capable of climbing at a defined rate, to be
FPA1 limited by minimum and maximum engine performance and airspeeds.
4 G-130 G-180,A1,A2 The guidance shall be capable of descending at a defined rate, to be
limited by minimum and maximum engine performance airspeeds.
5 G-140 G-120,G-200 The guidance shall be capable of climbing at a specified rate
to a specified altitude, to be limited by maximum engine
performance for a set airspeed
6 G-150 G-180,A1,G-120, The guidance shall be capable of descending at a specified rate
A2,G-200 to a specified altitude, to be limited by maximum engine
performance for a set airspeed
7 G-170 (Mode) – The altitude control shall engage when the altitude control mode
is selected and when the FPA control mode is not selected, and when
there is no manual pitch or manual roll command from the stick.
8 G-180 (Mode) – The FPA control shall engage when the FPA mode
is selected, and when there is no manual pitch or manual roll
command from the stick.
9 G-100 – The Guidance system shall be capable of maintaining a steady speed
in the normal flight envelope.
10 G-200 – If the altitude control is engaged, once the plane is within 250 ft of
the commanded altitude, the plane will remain within 250 ft
of the commanded altitude.
11 G-210 (Mode) – If the FPA control and the altitude control are both selected, the FPA
control will disengage and the altitude control will engage once the
lane is within 200 ft of the commanded altitude.
12 G-220 (Mode) – The heading control shall engage when the heading control mode
is selected, and when there is no manual pitch or manual roll
command from the stick.
13 G-230 – If the altitude control is engaged with no active speed control,
the speed control shall engage and the speed command shall synchronize
to the current speed, which shall become the new altitude’s target speed.
14 G-240 – The bank angle limit is established by the Bank Angle Limit Selector.
15 G-260 (Mode) – When the heading control mode is engaged, roll commands
are given to turn in the nearest direction to the selected heading.
16 G-270 (Mode) – Manually positioning the thrust levers does not cause
autothrottle disengagement.
17 G-290 – The autothrottle will be limited by the max and the min throttle.
18 G-160 – The guidance function shall be able to automatically deploy spoilers
to limit speed in a descent, or when a significant reduction in
airspeed is requested by the pilot, deactivating at low speed.
19 G-280 – The FCCs shall issue a warning when the commanded altitude
disagrees with the stored commanded altitude stored in the FCCs.
20 G-190 – If any control surface actuator loses hydraulic pressure,
the autopilot shall disengage.
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3. Identify affected components and signals of the control model. At this stage
properties are still formulated in natural language and state vague things like
“The guidance shall be capable ...”. Such expressions cannot be mapped to the
TCM directly. The model describes sensors and signals. We therefore have to
express properties in terms of the signals available in our model. In our study, we
motsly relied on domain experts to help us with this step. In the case of G-120,
we had to refine “being capable” as the concrete situations in which the control
system is expected to act. This could be expressed as “If in FPA-control mode,
and if there is no manual aileron or pitch command from the pilot ...”, which
can be mapped to signals in the model.
4. Decompose the requirement on the control system into sub-requirements
on single components. In some cases, the formalized requirements specify be-
havior of the complete control system in terms of its global inputs and outputs.
However, proving the requirements marked gray (7-17) in Table 1 required in-
formation about internal signals between lower level components. We therefore
decomposed these requirements into sub-requirements over internal signals be-
tween components. These sub-requirements were not merely slices of the global
property but actual assume/guarantee pairs that we derived manually.
Property G-120, for example, was decomposed as illustrated in Fig. 3 (the
figure displays Lustre code, as translated from Simulink by our compiler). The
decomposition expresses the fact that the FPA control module, when engaged,
is in charge of maintaining an FPA (FPA1). The mode logic ensures that the
guidance system cannot be in Altitude Control mode and FPA control mode
at the same time (i.e., these modes are mutually exclusive). Based on this fact,
the remaining properties express that: – in FPA control mode, the FPA control
module is engaged (G-180); – if not in Altitude control mode, then the Altitude
control module is not engaged (A1), and when not engaged, the Altitude control
module will not send commands (A2). As a result, when in FPA control mode,
the FPA will be the only mode engaged, and it will issue commands to maintain
an FPA, which means that the guidance system is able to climb at a defined
rate.
Property formalization helped us identify missing functionalities in the TCM
model and also led us to refine many properties.
– Three requirements specify behavior for components not modeled by the
TCM (e.g., spoilers). These requirements could not be formalized.
– All properties that included the behavior of the mode logic had to be made
more precise. At this point, the requirements were precise enough to have a
unique formal representation as (temporal) logic formulas over signals of the
TCM.
– We defined five sub-requirements (e.g., A1 and A2 in Fig. 3) for properties
that were verified compositionally.
All requirements except the six for the mode logic and two requirements on
operational limits required making assumptions about the physics of the aircraft.
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4 Verification of the TCM
This section describes our verification efforts for the TCM: how we handle
Simulink models, and how we encode and verify properties. The complete TCM
benchmark (Simulink models and Lustre code) can be found in [1].
4.1 Handling Simulink Models
To apply SMT-based model checking, we compile the TCM Simulink model into
the synchronous dataflow language Lustre [6,16]. In the following, we briefly in-
troduce Lustre and then describe the compilation process and how safety prop-
erties are encoded and verified.
Lustre Synchronous languages are a class of languages proposed for the design of
reactive systems (i.e., systems that maintain a permanent interaction with their
physical environment). Such languages are based on the theory of synchronous
time, in which the system and its environment are considered to both view time
with some “abstract” universal clock. Lustre combines each data stream with an
associated clock as a means to discretize time. The overall system is considered
to have a universal clock that represents the smallest time span the system is
able to distinguish, together with additional, coarser-grained, user-defined clocks.
Therefore the overall system may have different subsections that react to inputs
at different frequencies. At each clock tick, the system is considered to evaluate
all streams, so all values are considered stable for any actual time spent in
the instant between ticks. Lustre programs and subprograms are expressed in
terms of Nodes. Nodes directly model subsystems in a modular fashion, with an
externally visible set of inputs and outputs. A node can be seen as a mapping
of a finite set of input streams (in the form of a tuple) to a finite set of output
streams (also expressed as a tuple).
Simulink to Lustre In Matlab/Simulink from MathWorks c©5, dynamic sys-
tems are modeled as block diagrams. Simulink uses dataflow-oriented block di-
agram notation which consists of blocks and lines. Blocks represent either some
kind of functionality, like mathematical or logical functions, or they are used for
structuring the model in terms of subsystem blocks, port blocks, bus blocks etc.
Every block is defined by its type and its block parameters.
We have developed a tool called GAL6 (GeneAuto for Lustre) based on the
GeneAuto7 tool set. The latter is a tool for the automatic code generation of
Simulink models to generate C, VHDL and Ada code. Although the develop-
ment of the generator was of primary interest, the GeneAuto project also put
an emphasis on the qualification of the toolchain [29] by providing traceability
information all along the code generation process.
5 http://www.mathworks.com/
6 https://bitbucket.org/lememta/gal
7 http://www.geneauto.org
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Fig. 2. Simulink model of the Altitude Controller subsystem with a safety property
encoded as synchronous observer.
GAL can only translate a subset of Simulink blocks. This subset can be char-
acterized as a collection of the most basic discrete-time blocks in Simulink. In
a typical controller model built by control engineers, one is likely to encounter
additional blocks such as the transfer function block, the saturation blocks,
the dead-zone block, and the integrator block. These blocks have to first be
transformed into equivalent Simulink models that GAL can handle. We have
developed an automated pre-processor for Simulink models, that transforms an
arbitrary Simulink model into a model “digestible” by GAL. The pre-processor
also generates an equivalence check between the original and transformed mod-
els, modulo finite-precision arithmetic and discretization. The check can be per-
formed using standard simulation techniques supported by Matlab. Note that
our pre-processor provides automated support for transformations that are stan-
dard among aerospace engineers when using the MathWorks c© Simulink Coder8.
Encoding safety properties An extensively used technique to define expected
behavior is synchronous observers [17]. Synchronous observers provide an alter-
native to temporal logics for specifying safety properties; the benefit of observers
is that they express properties in the same notation as the system model [26].
Observers are typically used for simulation and testing purposes. A synchronous
observer is a wrapper used to test observable properties of a node N with mini-
mal modification to the node itself; it returns an error signal if the property does
not hold. The task of checking the property is thus reduced to simply checking
if the stream is constantly true.
Synchronous observers are expressed in Simulink using a masked subsystem
block. A subsystem block is a container for a set of blocks. Masking a block means
extending it with some additional parameters. An example of such synchronous
observers expressed in Simulink is given in Figure 2. The red blocks encode the
8 http://mathworks.com/products/simulink-coder/
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safety property expressed as synchronous observer. GAL translates these blocks
as a property annotation to be proven in Lustre.
Specifically, a Lustre observer is a node taking as input all the flows relevant
to the safety property to be specified, and computing a Boolean flow (e.g., “Obs”
in Fig. 3) which is true as long as the observed flow satisfies the property. We
have used PKind [22] to prove the safety properties of Lustre programs. PKind
is a parallel k-induction-based model checker [22], which includes automated
invariant generation based on templates [21] and abstract interpretation [13].
4.2 Safety verification results
Table 1 summarizes the verification results of the 20 safety properties on the
TCM model. At the beginning of the verification process, we discovered several
modeling errors within the TCM, which led to the falsification of some properties:
1. Some components produced output when disabled (e.g., the altitude con-
troller). This happened because the TCM model given to us was incomplete:
the mode logic was not implemented completely (which also affected the
mode logic properties). We remedied these problems by incorporating the
necessary mode logic into the model.
2. Manual inputs from the pilot did not override the outputs of the autopilot
for all three axes. This was again due to an incompleteness in the TCM
model. We added a Simulink block (before the final output of the autopilot)
to reflect the fact a pilot has the ability to override the autopilot output.
3. Some inputs were not variables but appeared as fixed constant values in the
model (e.g., the bank angle limit of G-240). This was simply a modeling
error, and it was easily corrected by modifying the appropriate variables.
4. G-180 had to be refined to resolve a conflict with G-210 and the implicit
assumption that only the FPA control or the altitude control can be active at
any moment in time.
The results obtained for verification after the above changes are described
in Table 1. The properties are colored according to the verification technique
used. Gray properties (7-17) are the ones proved via a compositional argument.
Green properties (1-6) are the ones proved with a direct (non-compositional)
proof technique. Red properties (17-20) are the ones that could not be proven
on this specific model of the TCM. The latter properties applied to the B737
vehicle (see Section 3), however they referenced functionalities not implemented
in the TCM. It took an average of 2secs for PKind to verify the green properties.
All properties were first attempted directly, without a compositional argu-
ment. PKind was unable to verify the gray properties, despite a very high timeout
setting (5 hours). Since k-induction is sound but not complete, this result has
two possible interpretations: these properties are k-inductive for an extremely
high k or, more plausibly, they are not k-inductive for any k. We have also tried
other Lustre verification tools based on different verification techniques. Specif-
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ically, we used Kind-29 and Zustre10. Kind-2 is a complete re-implementation
of PKind that also adds a verification engine based on IC3 [4], while Zustre is
a tool based on the generalized property-oriented reachability implemented in
Z3 [18]. Both tools were not able to prove the gray properties.
In a second step, we decomposed the properties either in terms of component-
level properties (e.g. G-120, G-130, G-140, G-150), or in “simpler” properties to
deal with (e.g. G-250, G-110). We now give details of the compositional analysis
of G-120 (see Section 3 for the natural language description). This property
involves 3 components of the TCM longitudinal control system: the Mode Logic,
the Altitude controller and the Flight Path Angle (FPA) controller. In order to
prove G-120, we decomposed the property into 4 component-level properties:
G-180 and A1 for the Mode Logic; A2 for the Altitude controller and FPA1
for the FPA controller. After proving the component level properties, one still
needs to make a formal compositional argument that these properties imply the
system-level property G-120. The latter argument is captured in Figure 3. The
upper box shows the Lustre nodes of the various components involved in G-120.
Each component comes with its own guarantees. Such guarantees are used as
assumptions in proving G-120 (described in the lower box).
5 Lessons Learned
In this section, we summarize our experience and lessons learned from the appli-
cation of formal methods to the TCM case study. Some findings confirmed our
expectations: for example, we anticipated the fact that we would need to con-
sult with domain experts both for requirements elicitation, and for assumption
generation. We had, however, underestimated the extent to which this would be
required. Others surprised us: it took an extremely long time to identify a case
study that is both representative of flight-critical systems, and publicly avail-
able; the requirements elicitation and formalization phases were also much more
involved than we expected. Regarding how far we would be able to go with this
case study, we had no expectations to begin with, since we knew nothing about
the system that we analyzed when we started our work.
1. Case studies are hard to find. It is difficult to obtain real case studies that
are not proprietary and that can be shared outside an institution. The TCM is
available for General Purpose Release from NASA Langley, with case number of
LAR-18322-1. The process for obtaining the code is detailed in the latest NASA
Software Catalog11. The TCM benchmark used in this paper can be found in [1].
2. System description must be massaged. Despite the progress in automating
verification techniques, a huge amount of effort still needs to be placed in such
a task. First of all, it is rare that verification tools are able to directly handle
all the features of the languages in which systems are expressed. Despite the
race towards keeping verification tools up-to-date, modeling or programming
9 http://kind2-mc.github.io/kind2/
10 www.bitbucket.org/lememta/zustre
11 http://technology.nasa.gov/NASA_Software_Catalog_2014.pdf
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node AutoP i l o t (HeadMode , A i l S t i c k , E l e vS t i c k , AltMode : r e a l ;
FPAMode , ATMode , AltCmd , A l t i t u d e , CAS ,CASCmdMCP: r e a l ; )
r e t u r n s (HeadEng , AltEng , FPAEng , ATEng : boo l ; CASCmd: r e a l ) ;
l e t
−− G−180
a s s e r t (FPAMode = 0 . 0 ) or ( not ( A i l S t i c k = 0 . 0 ) ) or
( not ( E l e v S t i c k = 0 . 0 ) ) or (FPAEng = t r u e ) ;
−− A1
a s s e r t ( not ( AltMode= 0 . 0 ) ) or ( AltEng = f a l s e ) ;
t e l
node A l t i t u d eC o n t r o l ( AltEng : boo l ; AltCmd , A l t : r e a l ;
GsKts , Hdot , HdotChgRate : r e a l )
r e t u r n s (AltGammaCmd : r e a l ) ;
l e t
−− A2
a s s e r t ( AltEng = t r u e ) or (AltGammaCmd = 0 . 0 ) ;
t e l
node FPAControl ( Engage : boo l ; AltGammaCmd , Gamma: r e a l ;
ThetaDeg , VT: r e a l )
r e t u r n s ( PitchCmd , PrePitchCmd : r e a l ) ;
l e t
−− FPA1
a s s e r t t r u e −> ( Engage = f a l s e ) or (AltGammaCmd = Gamma)
or ( (AltGammaCmd > Gamma) and ( PitchCmd > pre ( PrePitchCmd ) ) )
or ( (AltGammaCmd < Gamma) and ( PitchCmd < pre ( PrePitchCmd ) ) ) ;
t e l
node G−120 (HeadMode , A i l S t i c k , E l e vS t i c k , AltMode : r e a l ;
FPAMode , ATMode , AltCmd , A l t i t u d e , CAS : r e a l ;
CASCmdMCP, Gskts , Hdot , HDotChgRate , GammaCmd: r e a l ;
Gamma, ThetaDeg , VT: r e a l )
r e t u r n s (Obs : boo l ) ;
va r
AltGammaCmd , FPain , TAlt , TFpa : r e a l ;
HeadEng , AltEng , FPAEng , ATEng : boo l ;
CasCmd , PitchCmd , PreP i t ch : r e a l ;
l e t
HeadEng , . . . , CasCmd = AutoP i l o t (HeadMode , . . . , CASCmdMCP) ;
AltGammaCmd = A l t i t u d eC o n t r o l ( AltEng , . . . , HDotChgRate ) ;
PitchCmd , PreP i t ch = FPAControl (FPAEng , . . . , VT) ;
a s s e r t FPain = (AltGammaCmd + GammaCmd) ;
a s s e r t ( AltMode = 0 . 0 ) ;
a s s e r t ( not (FPAMode = 0 . 0 ) ) ;
a s s e r t ( E l e v S t i c k = 0 . 0 ) ;
a s s e r t ( A i l S t i c k = 0 . 0 ) ;
a s s e r t (GammaCmd > 1.0 and GammaCmd < 1 0 . 0 ) ;
Obs = t r u e −> (GammaCmd = Gamma)
or ( (GammaCmd > Gamma) and ( PitchCmd > pre ( p r eP i t c h ) ) )
or ( (GammaCmd < Gamma) and ( PitchCmd < pre ( P r eP i t ch ) ) ) ;
−−!PROPERTY: obs = t r u e ;
t e l
Fig. 3. Compositional argument for G-120 property.
languages are typically a step ahead. There is therefore always an initial step
involved, where the system description is massaged to be handled by the targeted
verification tools.
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3. Requirements elicitation. Requirements of flight-critical systems are often
hard to identify [15,14]. Even when requirements are available, they are very
often written in natural language and need to be translated into a clear notation
with unambiguous semantics. We had seriously under-estimated the effort that
would be required in coming up with requirements that we could verify. We in-
volved collaborators from NASA’s Armstrong Flight Research Center, and still
required a lot of additional effort to bridge high-level requirements with verifi-
able, component-level ones. It is the first time that we had to tackle requirements
starting from FARs, and we appreciate the complexity of certification tasks, and
the use of safety cases to organize them [8] (we used safety case tools to organize
our requirements, but cannot present this work here due to limited space).
4. Incomplete requirements and assumptions. Our case study confirmed that
requirements are often incomplete or even wrong. Developers often make as-
sumptions about the physics or the environment of a system that are not ex-
plicitly expressed, and without which requirements do not hold. The capability
to analyze requirements with automated tools is invaluable in identifying such
problems with requirements. For example, the analysis we performed for prop-
erty G-120 (see Section 4) revealed the fact that an implicit assumption needed
to be formalized and become part of the requirements.
5. Scalability. The amount of progress in automating verification has been
substantial. However, there will always be properties and systems on which the
verification does not scale, unless more sophisticated compositional approaches
are introduced to break the problem into smaller, more manageable, tasks. Com-
positional verification was needed to address 6 of the 20 requirements that we
studied (gray properties in Figure 1). Decomposing requirements was a non-
trivial, manual task. Although our tools for this type of system do not di-
rectly support automated assumption generation and compositional verification
yet, we believe that such techniques could facilitate the application of our ap-
proaches [19].
6. Domain expertise. Our case study proved that we are not yet at the point
where formal verification can occur in the absence of domain expertise. All of the
activities in observations 2, 3, and 4 above, required extensive discussion with a
domain expert that was part of the team assembled for this study.
7. Verification tools. Automated formal verification tools have made tremen-
dous progress in recent years. They are able to cope with the growing complexi-
ties of systems. In our work, this was the key enabler in carrying out the safety
analysis of TCM. Specifically, SMT-based model checking was quite effective in
discharging the safety properties. In certain components of the TCM we had to
deal with nonlinear arithmetic operations (e.g., trigonometric functions). While
nonlinear arithmetic operations are not fully supported in current SMT solvers,
we were able to cope with that by using uninterpreted functions 12. Handling
nonlinear arithmetic operations is essential for the verification of flight-critical
12 The idea is to substitute nonlinear functions with uninterpreted one. This could lead
to non-feasible counterexamples. In this case we add additional constraints to the
uninterpreted function in order to eliminate such counterexamples.
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systems; it is therefore desirable to develop tools that can robustly handle these
features.
9. Level of effort. Verifying the TCM required approximately three person
months (see Table 2), with the involvement of verification and aeronautics ex-
perts. Most of our time was spent eliciting the properties, formalizing them, and
creating the assumptions about the physical environment that we need for ver-
ification. We also spent several weeks working towards utilizing our verification
within a future safety case effort. The actual verification process was automated,
and required the least time.
Table 2. TCM verification: Approximate level-of-effort
Effort Person Months
Implementation (Tools) 0.50
Preparation of Models 0.50
Property Elicitation 0.25
Formalization (Relation to model) 0.50
Physical Assumptions 0.50
Compositional Arguments 0.25
Verification 0.20
Safety Case Generation 0.50
6 Related Work
Our aim in designing this study was to make it as realistic, independent, and
shareable as possible, and hence we targeted a system that is representative
of flight-critical systems, that was developed outside our group, and that is
available to the research community. It is hard to find realistic studies in the
research community that are not proprietary and that can therefore be used as
benchmarks.
In recent work, we have applied probabilistic verification and synthesis tech-
niques to analyze the ACAS X onboard collision avoidance system [30]. More-
over, we have developed a testing infrastructure for the automated analysis of
the AutoResolver air-traffic control system, aimed at the prediction and resolu-
tion of aircraft loss of separation [15]. A previous large study performed by our
group aimed at comparing model checking, static analysis, runtime analysis and
testing, through their application for finding bugs in the Executive component
of an autonomous robot developed at NASA Ames [5]. These systems are not
publicly available.
Several studies related to the verification of flight-critical systems have been
performed by Rockwell Collins. In [24], the authors report on the use of their
automated framework to verify Simulink and Stateflow designs of three aeronau-
tics components: the ADGS-2100 Window Manager, for ensuring that data from
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different applications is routed to the correct aircraft display panel; two compo-
nents of the operational flight program of an unmanned aerial vehicle developed
by Lockheed Martin Aerospace, one involving redundancy management, and the
other one in charge of generating actuator commands for the aircraft’s six con-
trol surfaces. These studies confirmed the applicability and benefits of formal
verification techniques in the design of flight-critical systems. The commercial
components that were targeted are not publicly available.
More recently, Rockwell Collins has developed compositional techniques for
scalable verification of architectural models expressed in the AADL language [7].
Funded through a NASA NRA, they have recently applied compositional verifica-
tion to TCM architectural models, in the context of the same program milestone
that drove this work13.
The Astrée static analyzer has been used to prove the absence of runtime
errors from two Airbus components implemented in C [28,2], as well as from a C
version of the automatic docking software of the Jules Vernes Automated Trans-
fer Vehicle (ATV) enabling ESA to transport payloads to the International Space
Station [3]. Galdino et al [11] use the PVS theorem prover to formally verify an
air-traffic control resolution and recovery algorithm. In the domain of hybrid
system verification, Platzer and Clarke [25] have applied the KeYmaera verifi-
cation tool to prove properties of curved flight collision avoidance maneuvers.
Esteve et al. have applied a probabilistic model checker to determine properties
of an early design spacecraft model for the European Space Agency [9].
For an extensive study of success stories related to the application of formal
verification in practice, we refer the reader to the following technical report by
Garavel and Graf [12]. Note that, in this paper, we focus on case studies related
to avionics; several other studies of safety-critical systems have been performed,
for example in the contexts of medical devices and of the automotive industry.
7 Conclusion
To summarize, we demonstrated a verification approach for the TCM controls
system: a publicly available, realistic and complex flight-critical system of moder-
ate size. This study required a significant amount of effort from a team made up
of both verification and domain experts. Compositional verification was required
to prove some of the safety properties of the system. The only safety properties
we did not prove in this study were those in which the desired functionality had
not actually been modeled. Our experience highlights the promise of composi-
tional verification in the certification of flight-critical systems. In practice, we
saw that the most significant part of our effort was in defining and formalizing
the appropriate properties, starting from high-level FARs requirement, all the
way down to properties of the target system. We hope that our experience will
be useful to other researchers and will encourage them to apply and evaluate
alternative techniques on the TCM case study. To this aim, we have made all
the artefacts of our benchmark publicly available.
13 The case studies performed in this work can be found in www.github.co/smaccm
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